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INTRODUCTION 
"In every human group there is a diversity of opinion, taste, 
inclination, and outlook which, when the group is organized in the 
form of a society, creates a majority and one or more minorities." 1 
National minorities are formed by groups of peoples with a national 
consciousness, usually accompanied by linguistic and cultural differences, 
distinct from the majority. The problem of dealing with nationalistic 
groups has faced many nations throughout the course of history. 
Certainly it is a problem that might well be considered among the 
chief concerns of Poland. 
Poland, situated at the crossroads of trade between eastern and 
western Europe, has been an arena for opposing armies throughout the 
centuries, and her avaricious neighbors have frequently swooped down 
upon her as delectable prey in their rapacious desires for more land. 
Though "the boundaries of Poland have shifted as the sands of the 
seashore" 2 and though disaster long blotted its name from the list 
of countries, "nothing is more characteristic of Poland than a certain 
basic persistence that argues foundations made not of sand but of soul." 3 
1 Azcarte, P. De. League of Nations and National Minorities. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1943, 3. 
2 A Symposium. Contemporary Europe. D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 
N.Y., 1941, 415. 
3 ~., 428. 
1 
2 
The original Polish kingdom as it grew up in the tenth, eleventh, 
and twelfth centuries under its first dynasty, the house of the Piasts, 
was a comparatively small state. "It embraced the area which forms 
ethnographic Poland today, and also the rest of Silesia and Pomerania. 
Having the Oder for a part of its western boundary and a broad strip 
of Baltic coast line, Poland in its earliest period enjoyed better 
natural frontiers than it was ever later to possess." 4 
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries ushered in an era of 
vicissitudes for Poland. The invasions and devastations of the Mongols 
coupled with civil wars among her princes and partitioning among her 
neighbors not only weakened the kingdom but rent it asunder. 
So complete was the ruin wrought by 
the invasion, that foreign capital and 
labour were needed to rehabilitate the 
count~J. This state of affairs led to a 
great influx of German and Jewish colonists, 
who found the circums~ances highly favourable 
to their settlement. ~ 
The skilled German artisans and craftsmen introduced into Poland the 
industries and arts of Western Europe, "while the Jewish merchants 
found full scope for their talents in buying, selling, and transporting 
native and foreign goods." 6 Towns and cities increased in number 
and importance, and trade made great progress under the influence of thes 
4 C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord. Some Problems of the Peace Conference. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1920, 1597-
5 Ninian Hill. Poland and the Polish Question. F. A. Stokes, N.Y., 
1915, 20. --
6 Ibid. 
two groups of foreigners who settled in Poland at this time. 
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the republic of 
Poland was 
the freest state in Europe, the state in which 
the greatest degree of constitutional, civic, 
and intellectual liberty prevailed. In an ' 
age of religious persecution and chronic 
religious wars, Poland knew no such troubles; 
it offered almost complete toleration and an 
asylum to those fleeing from persecution in 
all western lands. Like the United states 
today, Poland was at that time the melting-
pot of Europe, the haven for the poor and 
oppressed of all the neighboring countries--
Germans, Jews, Czechs, Magyars, Armenians, 
Tartars, Russians, and others. The complications 
of the nationality problem in Poland today 
are due in no small measure to the great 
numbers of aliens who here found a refuge from 
political and religious persecution. 7 
• 
3 
The welding of these conflicting racial elements into one nation 
has constituted one of Poland's greatest problems. It has become a 
heritage, along with her position as buffer-state between powerful 
neighbors, which continually keeps her anxious and turbulent, and the 
temperamental, headstrong, ambitious Pole has not yet found the remedy 
which will bring about a solution. 
In order to understand more fully the concept of nationalism as 
a conflicting element in Polish integrity it is necessary to seek the 
root of its beginning and trace its development through the centuries. 
7 Haskins and Lord, 166. 
4 
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt a survey of the relations 
between Poland and two of her strong nationalistic groups, the Jews 
and the Germans, as they existed before 1918 and their status as 
minority groups after that period up to the outbreak of the second 
World War. 
CHAPTER I 
THE JEWS AND GERMANS IN POLAND PRIOR TO THE WORLD WAR 
No country in Europe contains so many 
of the Jewish race as Poland. There, as 
elsewhere, they form a people apart. 
Centuries have come and gone, but they 
remain as much strangers and pilgrims in the 
land of their adoption as when they first 
entered. 8 
The Jews first came to Poland in considerable numbers in the 
ninth century. Invited by the King of Poland in order to build up 
Polish commerce, the Jews willingly left Germany and Bohemia where 
they were being persecuted, to settle in a land of adoption where 
things were more pleasant for them. 
When the Jews entered Poland there were only two fixed classes 
in that country, the land-owning nobles and the peasants working the 
soil. The Jews were to serve as the third estate. 
Because of their special function, they 
were held by the rulers of Poland in high 
regard. Their status was guaranteed by 
charters. The oldest of these charters 
was given to the Jews of Posen in 1264 by 
Bo1es1av, Prince of Great Poland. 9 
To distinguish it from the provincial or local privileges granted 
8 Hill, .53. 
9 Simon Segal. 
1938, 17.5. 
The New Poland and the Jews. Lee Furman, Inc ., N. Y • , 
6 
to Jews it came to be known as the "Jewish statute" (statuta Judeorum). 
Copies of this Charter of Privileges are still extant and prove that 
the Jews in Poland were treated with toleration at a time when they 
were being persecuted elsewhere. Some of the most interesting clauses 
in the Charter are the following: 
(1) In cases against a Jew a Christian 
alone cannot bear witness: Jews must 
also do so. 
(3) A Jew may take any article as a pledge 
except those used in Church or soaked 
in blood. 
(6) When a pledge has been stolen and the 
Jew swears he did not know of it, then 
the Christian must pay him the capital 
lent upon the pledge and the interest 
thereof. 
(7) When a Christian pledge is lost, by fire 
or by theft, whilst in a Jew's keeping, 
the Jew may free himself from the respon-
sibility thereof by oath. 
(8) The Jews in quarrels amongst themselves 
are excluded from the Polish tribunals; 
they shall remain under the protection 
of the King, or a Wojewoda (Governor 
of a district). 
(9) He who wounds a Jew shall pay a fine 
and the costs of his cure. 
(10) He who murders a Jew shall pay a fine and 
suffer confiscation of his property. 
(11) He who strikes a Jew shall pay a fine. 
(12) Jews shall not pay higher taxes than the 
towns-people. 
(14) 
(18) 
(~ 
(24) 
(26) 
(21) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(35) 
(36) 
A christian who spoils a Jewish 
cemetary shall suffer the confiscation 
of his estate and pay a fine besides. 
He who throws stones at a Jewish 
school shall give the Wojewoda two 
pounds of pepper. 
When there is no proof as to who has 
murdered a Jew, we will give legal 
protection against the suspected man. 
No man shall be quartered upon a Jew. 
The abduction of a Jewish child shall 
be considered as a theft. 
When a pledge has been in a Jew's pos-
session for a year and a day, it becomes 
his property. 
Jews cannot be forced to give back 
pledges upon their feast days. 
Those who take them away by force shall 
pay a fine. 
The Jew may not be accused of using 
Christian blood. 
In night attacks the neighbours must 
lend the Jews aid under pain of a fine. 
Jews may buy all kinds of goods and 
touch bread and other eatables. 10 
7 
The Jews freely profited by this Charter for the next century. 
By its provision they were under the direct jurisdiction of the King 
to whom they paid taxes, and not under the jurisdiction of the cities 
10 Beatrice C. Baskerville. The Polish Jew. The Macmillan Co., 
N.Y., 1906, 221-222. 
• 
in which they lived. "Harm to the Jew was considered harm to the 
King's treasury, and punishable by fine." 11 
During the fourteenth century many Jews left Germany to settle 
in Poland and King Casimer the Great (1333-1370), who was trying to 
8 
develop the economic life of his country, welcomed them but under his 
successor, King Ludwig of Hungary, the Jews began to suffer reverses 
in popularity. Their charter was modified and when the Kings of the 
House of Jagiellon began to reign they ~ere ordered to wear red 
patches upon their clothes and Tellow caps to distinguish them from 
the rest of the population." 12 By the fifteenth century a wave of 
anti-Semitism had swept over Poland and the country that had once 
been a haven of security for the Jew now became a place of persecution 
for his race. After the popular passion died down and the Jew once 
more emerged into being, restrictions met him at every turn until, 
in 1551 King Sigismund II granted the Jews the right to nominate their 
own rabbis. Stephan Batory (1576-1586) extended their privileges 
giving their Kahals the right to govern the internal affairs of their 
Communes. From then on the Jews of Poland enjoyed considerable self-
government. They were not deemed regular members of the municipalities 
11 Segal, 115. 
12 Baskerville, 222. 
9 
but were granted charters by the nobility or Szlachta, and the right 
to settle in groups upon their land. "Thus the Jews became more and 
more separated and began to exist as a national group within the 
country.~ 13 The liberal conditions under Which they were allowed to 
live prevented fusion between the Jews and the Poles, unconsciously 
sowing the seeds of future conflict. 
Yet the Pole used the Jew constantly; in fact it is difficult 
to see how he could have gotten on without him. The easy-going Pole 
entrusted the Jew with every business and from him he borrowed money. 
All that the Pole lacked in business capacity and moral courage the 
Jew possessed to an extraordinary degree. "It is characteristic of 
the Polish nature that anti-Semitism does not prevent the Jew from 
earning a living in those very pursuits for which he is most detested." 14 
Aristocratic Poles employ Jews to superintend their affairs because 
they can not take the trouble to submit them to the hands of a fellow 
Pole who will worry them with formalities and require time without 
limit in which to get the business done. It was the Pole who, happy 
to have financial aid always at hand, developed the Jew's money-lending 
propensities. 
13 Ibid., 224. 
14 !6IO., 66. 
All other occupations were proscribed. Not 
being able to possess land, he could not 
cultivate the soil; not being able to carry 
arms, he could not become a knight. Even 
the pursuit of crafts was forbidden him when 
the t'ownspeople found out how apt he was. 
His one monopoly was usury, and his only 
occupation commerce. Little wonder that he 
clung to both and exce~led in these two means 
of earning a living. 15 
10 
Originally there was no commerce between members of a community, 
no buying and selling at all. Individual fortunes could only be made 
by entering into relations with the external world. Thence came the 
necessity and importance of the fairs where Jews, foreign peddlers, 
and town merchants transacted business with the Polish peasants. 
Gradually the fair became a place where everybody could be treated as 
an outsider and money transactions could be concluded even with 
one's neighbor. 
It happened, and may happen still~ that 
when a farmer has a horse which his neighbor 
wants to buy they both go to the fair, and there, 
after the first has pretended to wait for a 
buyer and the second to search for a horse, 
they meet and conclude the transaction. Of 
course neither of them acknowledges that he 
intended to make the transaction beforehand. 
Actually the custom is almost broken down, 
but the peasant still does not like to buy 
from or sell to his neighbor, because he 
feels morally bound by the principle of economic 
equivalence and cannot hoge to do a particularly 
good piece of business. 10 
Since early Poland had no native bourgeoisie it was the Jews 
15 Ibid., 221. 
16 wrIIiam I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and America. Alfre.9. A. Knopf, N.Y. 0927, I, 184-185.-
11 
who principally constituted its middle class. The Jew performed the 
necessary commercial tasks beneath the dignity and beyond the capacity 
of the gentry. He served as an intermediary between the nobles and 
the peasants. 
Not only the noble but the peasant, as well, uses the Jew in 
Poland. Each peasant village owes its existence and maintenance in 
great measure to its Jewish occupants. 
The Jewish shop-keeper in a peasant village 
is usually also a liquor-dealer without license, 
a banker lending money at usury, often also . 
a receiver of stolen goods and (near the border) 
a contrabandist. The peasant needs and fears 
him, but at the same time despises him always 
and hates him often. The activity of these 
country shop-keepers is the source of whatever11 anti-Semitism there is in the peasant masses. 
Yet it is the Jew who holds the secret of a thousand homes for 
"he has crept into every Polish household from the palace to the manor, 
from the farmhouse to the cabin. He has become a despised necessity." 18 
The civil position of the Jews remained about the same in Poland 
until the year 1191 when the constitution of the third of May gave 
them equal civil and national rights. It removed all the disabilities 
which had hitherto pressed upon the Jews. From now on 
the Jews, who had hitherto only enjoyed the 
toleration of the Government, were henceforth 
to be considered as responsible members of 
11 Ibid., II, 1200-1201. 
18 Baskerville, 65. 
the community; the country had therefore the 
right to demand that they should have full 
advantage of a secular education. All dis-
tinctions of dress, of places of abode, and 
of legislation were to be removed, together 
with all differences but that of religion, 
which was free to all. All branches of 
industry were open to them. Their Communes 
were to have a voice in the Government of the 
country. They were to be allowed to occupy 
government posts and live in any districts 
of the towns or parts of the country they 
wished. They might and must share the 
military service with the rest of the com-
munity; they were to be admitted into all 
posts, ranks and positions upon perfect equality 
with Christians. Rewards and punishments, 
honours and dishonours were to be the same 
for all. In twenty years' time the! were to 
be allowed to buy landed property. 9 
12 
Had Poland been allowed to carry out these reforms, the history of her 
Jews might, perhaps, have been differently written. But it was not 
to be. Poland fell, and with it fell the Polish constitution. 
The Jewish problem developed differently in the divided Poland 
of the nineteenth century. Of the partitioning powers, each had its 
own policy. The majority of the Jews became subjects of the Tzar and 
Polish antipathy soon fanned into hostility under the pressure of 
Russian anti-Semitism. In Prussian Poland, the Jewish element that 
remained was kept within bounds by the semi-official anti-Semite 
19 Ibid., 234. 
• 
13 
tendencies of the Government, but many of the Jews in this section 
were attracted to the rapidly growing industrial centers of western 
Germany and migrated there. "Under Austria, where the Jews obtained 
real equality of rights, a large measure of assimilation between 
educated Jews and the Polish educated class was effected. tt 20 
Throughout her period of captivity though, Poland never ceased 
to be. 
The partitioning Powers had suceeded in 
erasing Poland from the map, but had signally 
failed to obliterate Polish nationalism. 
The Polish people remained a national unity 
in language and literature, traditions and 
religion, despite the dismemberment of their 
country and the protracted efforts of its 
despoilers to Russify or Germanize it. In 
brief, they were what they were--Poles, forming 
a Nation compacted together and distinguished 
from other nations by the thousand years of 
its history, whether in the day of glory or 
the night of eclipse. 21 
Submersed Poland signally failed to learn the lesson experience 
might have taUGht her. With her rebirth the problem of handling the 
nationalistic groups found within her borders was no better solved than 
before the time Poland had become such a group herself within the 
grasp of the powers that surrounded her. 
* * * 
The Germans, like the Jews, first came to Poland as inn ted 
20 Roman D.yboski. 
21 Robert.Machray. 
N.Y., 1937, 26. 
Poland. Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y., 1933, 176. 
The Poland of Pilsudski. E. P. Dutton and Co., 
• 
14. 
guests. In the year 1225 Conrad, Duke of Mazovia, seeking to safe-
guard his lands from the raids of the Baltic ?russians, unwisely invited 
the Teutonic Knights to settle on the border of Poland. The Knights 
succeeded not only in checking the attacks of the Baltic Prussians but 
• in establishing a German colony which became a formidable advance 
post of the "Drangnach Osten" in that region. By the next century they' 
had seized Polish territories in eastern Pomerania and endangered the 
country's access to the Baltic Sea. "Poland thus inherited a problem 
that was to tax the ingenuity of her ablest rulers and eventually was 
to threaten the very existence of the state." 22 
With the influx of German settlers in Poland after the Mongol 
inva.sion large portions of devastated territories were repopulated 
and built up. Complete assimilation of this foreign element without 
recourse to pressure took place in a short time giving evidence of the 
vitality and cultural solidarity of the Polish nation. 
Throughout the centuries, emigration from Germany to poland con-
tinued. Under the famous Magdeburg Law the German settlers had terri-
toria1 privileges beyond those ever enjoyed by the Jews. Unlike the 
Jews, however, the Germans became "po1onized tf in the course of time and 
soon ceased to exist as a separate factor in the population. It was 
only after the partitions the German "islands" began to appear in Poland. 
22 Bernadotte E. Schmitt (ed). Poland. University of California 
Press, Berkley, 1945, 37. 
... 
15 
When part of Poland fell subject to Germany at the time of the 
third partition of the country, Prince von Bulow clearly explained 
the policy Germany intended to pursue and as Ninian Hill puts it, 
"No Pole could have penned a more damning indictment of German policy 
23 than has the ex-Imperial Chancellor." Quoting from his book 
"Imperial Germany", he gives the key to the policy in the following 
sentences. 
Nothing is farther from the aims of our 
policy in the Eastern Marches, he writes with 
blank unctuosity, than a fight against the 
Poles; its object is to protect, maintain, 
and strengthen the German nationality among 
the Poles; consequently it is a fight for 
German nationality •••• No consideration for 
the Polish people must hinder us from doing 
all we can to maintain and strengthen German 
nationality in the former Polish domains •••• 
In the struggle, he says, between nationalities, 
one nation is the hammer, and the other is the 
anvil; one is the4victor, and the other the vanquished. 2 
The Prussian policy of colonizing her Polish provinces with 
Germans in systematic fashion produced a different type of immigration 
than that prior to the nineteenth century. 
23 Hill, 140. 
24 Ibid • 
Germanization, based on the idea of a German 
National state (Deutscher Nationalstaat) 
became an official policy in 1876, with the 
passage of the language law of that year. 
By the law of April 26, 1886, an act "concerning 
the furthering of German settlements in the 
province of west Prussia and Posen", a fund 
of 100iOOO marks was put at the disposal of the co onization commission to buy real 
estate from Polish owners for the purpose 
of settling German peasants and workers. 
This fund was increased several times, and by 
1914 a sum of 1,055,000 marks had been spent 
on the colonization program. The results 
were in some respects the opposite of What had 
been expected: the colonization program served 
to strengthen Polish nation~~ism and the 
opposition to German rule. 
• 
16 
The German population, many of whom were dependent upon the state 
for their livelihood failed in its prime purpose of impressing an 
artificial German character upon a Polish land. 
"The inescapable conclusion is that conflict is the most important 
element in the promotion of nationalism." 26 Nationalism, itself,:i.s ' 
a fluid term and in the vicissitudes of history has had many connotations. 
, 
In an ultimate analysis it denotes a dominant ethnocentrism, a purSUit 
of self-interest, whether aggressive or defensive. It is an element 
of grave importance in the understanding of the political and social 
problems of Polish history. 
25 Segal, 169. 
26 Francis J. Brown, Charles Hodges, Joseph S. Roucek, editors. 
contemporary World Politics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., N.Y., 
1940, 40. --
• 
CHAPTER II 
AT THE PEACE OF PARIS 
written in blood and tears, the history of Poland weighed heavily 
upon the conscience of EUrope. "At the Peace Conference statesmen 
bent over backwards to be helpful. Wilson had sentimental notions; 
Clemenceau thought of a mighty Poland as a check upon Germany. These 
were further played upon by two of the Polish representatives, the 
world-renowned Paderewski, and the quixotic war hero Pi1sudski." 27 
The work which awaited the framers of the treaty that was to remake the 
map of the worldwas as great and as unprecedented as the war which had 
just been brought to a close. However honest an attempt was to be made 
to establish real nation-states from which irredentism would be eliminated 
and, however meticulously boundary lines were to be drawn, minorities 
would inevitably have to remain. "In the grip of a hysterical national-
ism, harried by pressing economic problems, frightened by the growth 
of social radicalism, worn down by years of warfare, Poland was in no 
mood to be a sympathetic guardian of the rights of minority peoples." 
As the Great War progressed, the empires Which had partitioned 
Poland successively collapsed, and it remained for the Allies to redress 
the four partitions of 1712-1815 by establishing a national Poland 
27 Sachar, 112. 
28 Ibid., 114. 
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independent and secure of access to the sea. But the treaty that was 
to accomplish this task was the work of fallible men. "One of the 
chief lessons of the Peace Conference--a lesson enforced by every year 
that has followed it--is that experts should not displace statesmen 
in the determination of great issues." 29 
The Treaty was studied, prepared and discussed 
for six long months by fifty-eight technical 
commissions on which sat the foremost specialists 
of each country which held 1,646 meetings. 
The conclusions of these commissions verified 
by twenty-six local investigations, were 
discussed from January 10 to June 28 by three 
bodies: the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs which held thirty-nine meetings; 
the Council of Ten which held seventy-two 
meetings and the Council of Four Which held 
one hundred and forty-five meetings. These 
three Councils also gave hearings to the 
chairmen of tHe technical commissions, and 
all the representatives of Allied or neutral. 
countries interested. Finally when at the 
beginning of May, the texts were settled 
upon, the cabinets of the3~arious Powers were 
called into consulation. 
The committees, undoubtedly conscientiously applied themselves 
to the drafting of their various reports. The real fallacy of the 
treaty lay in the fact "that when the Allied and Associated Powers 
shifted over from the task of making the b~oad outlines of a preliminary 
peace to that of shaping a final treaty, they did not at that time 
29 
30 
Shotwell, James T., At the Paris Peace Conference, N.Y. The Macmillan 
Co., 1937, 26. --
Tardieu, Andre, The Truth about the Treaty, The Bobbs-Merri11 Co., 
N.Y. 1921, 97-98-. - -- -
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proceed to assemble the real Peace Conference, that which would include 
both victors and vanquished in the World War." 31 
Of all the parts of the Versailles Peace Treaty, there is, perhaps, 
none which required greater skill, greater moral courage to make than 
the Polish-German settlement. The rise of Prussia had been accomplished 
mainly by the spoliation of Poland. A genuine restoration of Poland 
then, must ultimately result, at least, in the partial downfall of 
Prussia. The great wealth of coal found in Upper Si1esia, ceded to 
Poland deprived Prussia of one of her chief sources of revenue. 
Could she be blamed for filing protest? yet the protest was not heeded 
and a dangerous issue was ceded to Poland with her inherited wealth 
in land. Dmowski, who had been invited to explain the Polish claim 
to territory, made great play with a German map 
showing the racial conquests on which their 
Colonizing Commission had spent $300,000,000 
between 1885 and 1914. Was the Conference to 
support such expropriation of the Polish 
natives? The Baltic question, he frankly 
declared, could not be settled without injury 
to one or the other side. Either East Prussia, 
an islandof nearly 2,000,000 Germans, must 
be cut off from the fatherland, or a like 
hurt must be inflicted on the West Prussian 
Poles, and in that case all Poland, a people 
of 25,000,000 souls, would be dominated by 
the Germans. 32 
The Poles are a people of intense patriotism which reaches a degree of 
almost fanatical fervor and Dmowski in the white heat of it struck 
31 Shotwell, 40. 
32 Cambridge History of Poland. Edited by W. F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, 
g~6H,!eCki, R. Dyboski. Cambridge University Press, London, 1941, II, 
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every vibrant chord that might apoeal to the Judges who were deciding 
his country's fate. 
Clemenceau, president of the Peace Conference, had himself a very 
simple program: Germany must be reduced to such a position that she 
could never again be a menace to France. He wanted Germany punished 
as though she were a uniquely sinful nation and France a sinless 
martyr land. \ 
"He wanted Germany so crippled and devastated 
as never more to be able to stand up to 
France. He wanted to hurt and humiliate 
Germany more than Fr ance had been hurt and 
humiliated in 1811. He did not care if in 
breaking Germany Europe was broken; his mind 
did not go far enough beyond the Rhine to 
understand that possibility •••• " 33 
Privately, Clemenceau condemned only Dmowski's claim to Teschen 
(Creszyn), and his attitude was of special importance, since France 
predominated in the Commission that was appointed to consider the 
Polish frontiers. 
Jules Cambon, formerly ambassador in Berlin, 
presided, with General Lerond, a geographical 
specialist, as Vice-president. Baron 
Degrand, the Foreign Office expert on 
Poland, Sir William Tyrrell, the Marquis della 
Torretta, and the Harvard professor, R. H. 
Lord, a master of partit~on histor,y, represented 
the Four Great Powers. 34 
Lloyd George, the mercurial Welshman, at the head of the British 
delegation to the Conference declared: "that an independent Poland, 
33 Achon, Erik, European Civilization and Politics since 1815. 
N.Y., Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934;-458. ----
34 cambridge, 497. 
comprising all those genuinely Polish elements which desired to form 
part of it, was an urgent necessity for the stability of western 
Europe." 35 President Wilson wished that the settlement of every 
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question whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangements, 
or of political relationship, to be upon the basis of free acceptance 
of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon 
the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation 
or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its 
own exterior influence or mastery. 36 
On 31 october 1918, the Americans who were 
explaining President Wilson's Fourteen points 
to the supreme War council, stated as the 
'chief problem' 'whether Poland is to obtain 
territory west of the Vistula which would 
cut off the Germans of East Prussia from the 
Empire, or whether Danzig can be made a 
free port and the Vistula internationalized.' 
They declared that' on the east, in Poland 
should receive no territory in which 
Li thuanians or Ukranians predominate. If 
Posen and Silesia go to Poland, rigid 
protection must be afforded the minorities 
of Germans and Jews living there, as well 
as in other parts of· the Polish State.' 37 
Wilson believed an imperfect peace better than no peace at all; above 
all, he believed that the League would eventually right any wrongs 
committed by the treaty. Leadership in the Conference lay with these 
three statesmen. It is difficult to conceive of three more widely 
36 capek, Thomas Jr., origin of the Czechoslovak state, The Kevell 
Press, 1926, 50. 
37 Cambridge, 490. 
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different natures than those of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson, 
yet upon their united decision the fate of Europe ultimately depended. 
When the Committee delegated to examine the question of the 
Polish frontiers submitted its reports to the Supreme Council of the 
Peace Conference it unanimously recommended the concession of tne 
greater part of what Dmowski had claimed. 
Danzig and the railway thence to Warsaw 
by way of Mlawa they would assign to Poland, 
whose 'economic necessity', they held, should 
override the wishes of a predominantly 
German population. In that region and in 
Upper Silesia they awarded her the districts 
with a Polish majority, except for Protestant 
Allenstein, where a plebescite should be 
held, and Teschen, which, for economic reasons, 
should fall to Czechoslovakia. 38 
The Supreme Council, however, upon hearing the report was divided 
in its opinion. The French still believed German ambition was 
inveterate and tney wished her to be as small and weak as possible, 
while they looked on Poland as a future ally against her. Wilson, 
wno reverenced nationality, favored the Polish claims. His trust in 
the League of Nations supported his decision. 
Lloyd George, however, seeing Germany 
prostrate and France omnipotent, declined to 
make this temporary situation the basis of 
a new and suspect power. He declared himself 
'strongly adverse to transferring more 
Germans from German rule to the rule of some 
other nation than can possibly be helped.' •••• 
38 Ibid., 501,2. 
To 'place 2,100,000 Germans', he said, 
'-under the control of a people which is of 
a different religion and which has never 
proved its capacity for stable self-government 
throughout its history must ••• lead sooner 39 
or later to a new war in tne East of Europe'. 
• 
The Germans hotly denounced tne alienation of a great part of 
a predominantly German province. Poland, t~ey maintained, had no 
connection with Silesia since 1163. It owed everything to Germany, 
and, as for a sign of Polish nationality tnere, they denied its 
existence declaring that even the language was but a Polish dialect. 
On June 16, having drawn up a plan for the 
voting, the Allies replied to the German 
Observations. They announced that, althougn 
in the district to be ceded the majority was 
indisputably Polish, they had decided to 
hold a plebiscite in lieu of immediate 
transference to poland. The restoration 
of the Polish state, they said, was a great 
historical act which must break many ties. 
But they were providing for the protection 
of the transferred Germans, as well as of 
all other minorities, religious; racial, 
or linguistic.' 40 
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The Jews were prominent at the Peace conference and were the most 
persistent advocates of minority rights. Among their demands they 
agitated for civil and political equality everywhere and special 
minority rights for the Jews in the new states to be established, viz., 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and in 
the enlarged states of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece. 
39 Ibid., 501,2. 
40 Ibid., 505. 
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The Paris Conference was disposed, in general, to give more 
weight to the principle of nationality, than to economic or strategic 
considerations. Yet it was an utter impossibility to create frontiers 
that did not cut off some people from what should have been their 
home-state. The Allied powers were anxious to protect these minorities 
and they, therefore, insisted upon special guarantees which became 
part of the peace treaties. poland was pledged to respect the 
legitimate aspirations of her minority groups, to grant them full 
political and civil equality, and to permit them to maintain their 
cultural identity through their own schools and the development of 
their own language. At first, Poland rebelled against such restrictions 
looking upon them as humiliating and likely to jeopardize national 
sovereignty and interfere with internal concerns but it was the price 
of her new nationa.l boundaries and she had to accept the tenus. 
TIle Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 
1919, and effective on January 10, 1920, was 
the keynote of the so-ca.lled Versailles system. 
Its declared purpose was to establish, preserve 
and secure peace. In this respect, it did 
not differ greatly from past peace treaties 
which had repeatedly attempted to establish 
perpetual and enduring peace •••• Tnere were, 
however, three interrelated elements which 
radically distingui&~ed Versailles from 
previous systems •••• These elements were (a) 
who established the peace; (b) the assumptions 
on-which it rested; and (c) the methods by 
which it was to be rendered secure. 41 
41 Robinson, Jacob, Oscar Karbach, Max M. Laseron, Kehemiah Robinson, 
Marc Vichuiak. Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure? Institute 
of Jewish Affairs-01 tne American Jewish Congress and the World 
Jewish Congress, N.Y. 1943, 27. 
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Although the Great Powers were signatory Parties to the Minorities 
Treaties, they actually could not exercise anJ> direct role in their 
enforcement because they delegated that function to the League of 
Nations. Instead of disposing of their disputes through political 
bargaining among the powers, as they had done before, the signatories 
of the Minorities treaties agreed to submit them to an international 
body. 
But the new 5,Ystem of guarantees for minorities 
did not include all European cOuntries and it 
lacked any real method of enforcement. For 
the League can act in a matter concerning 
a minority only if a member of the Council 
of the League brings to the Counci11s attention 
a-vIoIation or danger ~vioTatlon of the 
IDinori ties provisions. --..;:::,:::,: -- --
"Self-determination", a phrase that became an important issue of tne 
paris conference was protected by the Minorities treaties and, in 
spite of its deficiencies, the League became the guardian of the 
national aspirations of dominated peoples. 
The question of Minorities is but a new form of the old problem 
of nationalities, a problem "that has existed from the earliest history 
of mankind. Every primitive tribe had its intricate customs governing 
the treatment of the stranger. These customs continued long after the 
tribe had become part of a larger unit and were found in the laws of the 
slowly emerging nation-states. 11 43 
42 
43 
Dyboski, Roman, Outlines of Polish Histo~ London, George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1925, 66. -- ~, 
International Conciliation. Documents for the Year 1926 The 
Problems of Minorities, Sept. 1926, No. 222. 
• 
-
26 
Tod~ the major problem is not only how to protect the minorities, 
but also to protect the majorities against their own minorities. A 
resolution from the Third Assembly of the League of Nations, recognizing 
this as one of its serious problems, makes the following statement: 
"While the ASSEmbly recognizes the primar,f right of the minorities to be 
protected by the League from oppression, it also emphasizes the duty 
incumbent upon persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic 
minorities to cooperate as loyal fellow citizens with the nations to 
whicn t11ey now belong." 44 The members of the Peace Conference nad noped 
that by offering the minorities assured protection from the very beginning 
that they might be the more easily reconciled to their new positions. 
the rights of minorities are not based upon 
a contract between the state in question and 
its minority citizens, but are based upon a 
contact between the state in question and the 
League of Nations, thereby making them really 
effective. The importance of this lies in 
the fact that the protection of minorities 
is brought 1.Ulder the League's judicial and 
political system. The right of complaint, of 
intervention, of demanding redress in c~se 
of violation of the rights of minorities lies 
juridically with the League of Nations. 
Assumirig the moral authority of the League of 
Nations, and assuming its politically effective 
authority whi~~ is constantly increasing, 
minorities exposed to the possibility of 
oppression and those who are the beneficiaries 
of protective clauses in treaties have here 45 
a guarantee which cannot be too highly estimated. 
44 Brown, 48. 
45 International Conciliation. Documents for the Year 1926. 322. 
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The existence of national minon ties is not caused by a defective 
tracing of frontiers. In Europe it is impossible to form states comprising 
only peoples of the same race and language. 
No tracing of frontiers could suppress the 
existence of national minorities and assure the 
national homogeneity of the peoples of each 
state. The achievement of such homogeneity 
would be a physical impossibility without first 
effecting a transfer of such large masses of 
the population as to make the proposition 
absurd and the reason for this is that the 
territories and regions where national minorities 
exist are precisely those where the population 
is most mixed frQm a racial and linguistic 
point of view. 46 
Frontiers can not be based on the principle of national factors, alone, 
for applied in an absolute form they would establish frontiers which would 
destroy the effectiveness of th~ state they delimit. The Minorities 
treaties have been criticized on the ground that they tend to create a 
state within a state, which will ultimately lead to national disintegration 
but there is no clause preventing the voluntary merging of minorities and 
majorities, they merely prevent assimilation by force. Some means, too, 
of preventing infraction of minority rights had to be deVised; thus the 
intervention of an outside authority for the redress of real or imagina~ 
grievances was not entirely out of place. As had already been shown, 
the League made it its business to point out the necessity of a benevolent 
feeling of good-will between the minorities an~ their states while at 
the same time endeavoring to safeguard the interests of both. 
46 Azcarte, 6,7. 
r 
Finally, the Minorities treaties have been 
attacked on the ground that their provisions 
are inadequate and that they have not been 
enforced. The violation of these treaties has 
• 
been inevitable in view of the fierce nationalistic 
hatreds engendered during the war •••• Nevertheless, 
the existence of these treaties gives minorities 
a peaceful means of airing their grievances 
before the public opinion of the world. While 
reparation may not always be made, these treaties, 
imperfectly enforced, are better than no treaties 
at all. 47 
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Poland, on her part, gave elaborate securities for good behaviour, 
and some of the fundamental laws contained in the treaty were never altered 
by the Poles. Complete protection of life and liberty was promised, and 
right to such public and private worship as was consistent with public 
order and morals was granted to every inhabitant of the state. Polish 
citizenship could be claimed by all previous residents in her territory 
regardless of their former nationality, or they were free to adopt another 
within a year. All Polish nationals were equal before the law and any 
language might be employed in the press, at public meetings, and before 
the law by Polish nationals of non-Polish speech. Detailed p~Visions 
on the educational facilities to be provided for Polish citizens who 
belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities were incorporated 
in the Treaty. Articles eight and nine deal with the general problem, 
while Article ten contains a special provision concerning the administration 
of the Jewish schools. The text of the provisions reads as follows: 
47 International conciliation. Documents for the Year 1926. 363, 364. 
-Article 8: Polish nationals who belong to 
racial, religious, or linguistic minorities 
shall enjoy in law and in fact the same treatment 
and security as the Polish nationals. In 
particular, they shall have an equal right to 
establish, manage, and control at their own 
expense charitable, religious and social 
institutions, schools, and other educational 
establishments, with the rigJ:lt to use their 
own language and to exercise their religion 
freely therein. 
Article 9: Poland will provide in the public 
educational syste.11l in towns and districts 
in which a considerable proportion of Polish 
nationals of other than Polish speech are 
residents, adequate facilities for insuring that 
in the primary schools instruction shall be 
given to the children of such Polish nationals 
through the medium of their own language. This 
provision shall not prevent the Polish govern-
ment from making obligatory the teaching of 
the Polish language in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a 
considerable proportion of Polish nationals 
belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic 
minorities, these minorities shall be assured 
an equitable share in the enjoyment and appli-
cation of the sums which may be provided but 
of public funds under the state, municipal, or 
other budgets, for educational, religious or 
charitable purposes. 
Article 10: Educational committees appointed 
locally by the Jewish communities of Poland, will, 
subi8Ct to the general control of the state, 
provide for the distribution of the proportional 
share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools 
in accordance wi th Article 9, and for the 
organization and management of these schools. 
The proviSion of Article 9 concerning the 
use of language in the schools shall apply 
to these schools. 48 
48 Segal, 189, 190. 
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Jews were not to be compelled to Violate their sabbatll even in order 
to attend a law-court, while Poland agreed not to hold registrations or 
elections on Saturdays. 
It was almost ineVitable that great masses of their fellow-citizens 
would certainly hate the Poles. '!he League of Nations might, perhaps, 
be able to protect the new nation from foreign foes, but internal mis-
management might render Poland BolsheVist. It was not unreasonable, 
therefore, to make its protection conditional on a ~ufficient guarantee 
of moderation towards those races which the new commonwealth would 
incorporate against their will. 
CHAPTER ITI 
AFTER THE PEACE 
The principle of Nationalism popularized under tne term, self-
determination, was the touchstone upon which the Great Powers, who 
drew up the program of peace at the end of World war I, meant to rest 
their final decisions. Yet, 
What happened at Paris was but a Single 
act in a much larger drama, one which stretches 
back to the Middle Ages and reaches forward 
through the era of science and mobilized 
industry to envisage new and untried forms 
of political and economic relationships within 
and among nations. The Peace Treaties had to 
deal with facts for which they were not respon-
sible, but which, because registered in them, 
are thought of as their handiwork. For example, 
the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy took place 
months before the Treaties of st. Germain and 
Trianon were signed, and the documents in 
which the new sovereignties were recognized 
embodied, however blunderingly, the inescapable 
facts of war and revolution. It was impossible 
to draw this new map of Europe without doing 
injury to the vested interests of former 
governments and peoples. But it was also inevitable 
that the dispossessed would exploit the injury 
as a political slogan and a diplomatic weapon 
for years to come. 49 
The victors, on the other hand, would be forced to mount close guard over 
lands whose borders had become as President Wilson put it: "the frontiers 
of freedom". 
49 Shotwell, 49. 
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It is evident that the Peace Conference went beyond the nineteenth-
century precedent which had prescribed equality of treatment to all 
individuals, irrespective of religious affiliation, for the Minorities 
Treaties gave legal sanction to the perpetuation of the linguistic and 
cultural differences between the Minorities and Majorities of the states 
affected. Though the more ambitious hopes of the far-eastern Jews were 
not realized, still the Jews everywhere acclaimed the Minorities Treaties 
as a great victory. 
The general attitude of the Jews toward 
the treaty stipulation was well presented in 
a letter which Louis Marshall, Cyrus Adler and 
Nahum Sokolow sent to Boris Bogen, the adminis-
trator of Jewish relief in Poland. They wrote: 
Its (the Polish Treaty's) clauses are 
far-reaching. It confers complete civil and 
political rights upon all Jews of Poland, 
regardless of race, language, nationality, or 
religion. It carefully defines citizenship. 
It prevents discrimination. It adequately 
protects the life and liberty' of all the inhabi-
tants. It affords aaple security for the free 
exercise of religion, assures equality before 
the law, and free use of the languages of the 
several minorities and the right of management 
by them of their schools and other communal 
institutions with that of sharing in the public 
funds appropriated for educational and other 
like purposes. 
These rights of Minorities are declared 
by the treaty to be matters of international 
concern •••• This is an act of the first magnitude. 
In truth it constitutes a genuine charter of 
liberty for all minorities because its effective-
ness is guaranteed by the sanction of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. 50 
50 Janowsky, Oscar I., The Jews and Minority Rights. N.Y. columbia 
,University press, 19jJ,' j89. -
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The disabilities from which the Jews of Eastern Europe had long 
suffered seemed at end. The Jews of Poland were urged to forget the 
past and in the dawning of this new era to content themselves with what 
had been achieved and take the initiative in establishing cordial relations 
with their non-Jewish fellow citizens. 
Poland, owing her existence to the military 
and financial aid of the Allies, and tacitly 
promised their continued support, finally, 
agreed to abide honourably by the treaty 
provisions. They were set down clearly, in no 
uncertain tems, so that it lIOuld not be possible 
to seize upon ambiguities to whittle them 
away. 
All the guarantees, however, proved 
ineffective. Almost from the beginning Poland 
engaged in a policy of repression, applying to 
her minority groups the galling disCrimination5 which she herself had suffered for centuries. 1 
--
In order to understand Poland's policy of persecution it is important 
to remember the problems which. she faced as she emerged from the blood 
bath of war. 
Her territories were a union of provinces which 
for a hundred and fifty years had been under 
tnree foreign powers. Hence there was a tre-
mendous task of assimilation even among the 
Poles, for they had been transformed by many 
diverse traditiolls under Russian, German, and 
Austrian control. The west was industrial, 
highly developed; the East was agricultural, 
backward, illiterate. The frontiers of the 
country had no natural defences and yet they 
were threate~ed by enemies on all sides, 
especially by Russia and Germany. 52 
51 Sachar, 172,3. 
52 ~., 173. 
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A large share of the political misfortune of Poland has been due 
to the factional differences among the people themselves. Years of 
dismemberment have taught reunited poland the necessity and value of 
cohesion; thus reunion of the country in spirit a'ld culture has become 
the goal of the ambitious Poles. It is not an easy task to eradicate such 
marks as those imprinted upon each of the different sections of Poland 
during her years of subjection to foreign governments, and it is their 
fear that the Jews will oppose the fulfillment of this intense desire 
for unification that has led the Pole to continue in his hatred for the 
Jew. "Hatred is essentially based on fear, and it is fear that the 
Jews will thwart them in their national ambition that has brought forth 
the enmity of the Poles to as great a degree as their hatred for th~ 
Germans and the Russians.,,53 
The Jews form one of the largest of Poland's Minorities. '!hey are . 
scattered all over the country, numbering about three million, but to a 
I 
considerable extent they are concentrated mainly in the cities and are 
engaged in trade. With the rise of a Polish middle class after the war, 
the Jews no longer were needed to fill a void in Polish economic life. 
Indeed, in order to encourage economic activities among the majority 
population, organized boycotts against the Jews were effected. 
53 current History. Article: ItJewish problem in Polandlt • J. J. Kann. 
XIV: August, !92l, 778. 
In view of this economic stratification of 
the Jewish population, laws and administrative 
measures could easily be enacted which, while 
couched in general terms and ostensibly applying 
equally to all, were in effect directed mainly 
against the Jews. Tax laws were so conceived 
as to impose the greatest burden on the cities, 
and consequently upon the urban Jews. The 
cities of Eastern Europe paid most of the 
taxes, though the nations of that region were 
predominantly agricultural. 
In the guise of general laws, which to 
all appearances applied equal.ly to all citizens, 
Eastern Europe succeeded in depriving the 
Jews of their economic positions. 54 
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Until the mid-nineteenth century the Jews had pursued their way, 
unopposed, in the middle class occupations of Poland. Large settlements 
of Jewish population could be found in all the cities where, because 
the Pole shied clear of trade and commerce, the Jew dwelt in economic 
securi~. With the rise of Polish nationalism came the question: 
Why not a purely Polish middle class? The establishment of an independent 
Poland served to accelerate such an ideological movement. Moreover, 
after the war, it became necessary to completely transform Polish economy. 
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The markets of poland were cut away by 
the sudden separation from Russia and by the 
high tariff waJls of Germany, Austria, and the 
Baltic states. Agricultural prices declined 
and the peasants, burdened too heavily already 
by taxes to support the military colossus, 
faced ruin. Before the war the textiles of 
poland, its shoes and leather goods and gloves, 
were shipped by the millions of dozens into 
Russia and the lively trade kept the mills 
of Lodz, Bialystok, and other industrial centers, 
humming. But Bolshevik Russia no longer traded 
with poland. The textiles languished and the 
mills stood idle. The destruction of city 
braham, Duker, ~ in the Post-War World, Dryden 
• 
purchasing power adversely affected agricultural 
prices further, and they collapsed altogether. 
The sons of the starving peasants began 
to move in droves out of the villages, seeking 
to establish themselves in middle-class occupa-
tions and in the professions, in the towns and 
cities. But here the Jews had developed a 
high degree of efficiency, and it was difficult 
to compete with them. Conflict was inevitable. 
One Polish Senator later put the whole case 
frankly in terms of sociological law: I If 
the aboriginal nation reaches economic maturity, 
the immigrant nation must step aside. I Poles 
now desperately needed the economic pOSitions 
which were held by the Jews who had played out 
their roles and were no longer indispensable. 
They IDU§t go, if not voluntarily, then by 
force. ~5 
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The position formerly held by the Jews had only been justifiable, argued 
the Pole, when Poland had existed as a feudal domain. The suffering now 
produced by an economic depression served to intensify this feeling of 
hostility. Jewish persecution was an economic necessity in the eyes of 
eve~ patriotic Pole. 
In a radio speech presented on February 21, 1937 Colonel Adam Koc 
addressed the country in the following terms: 
Our attitude toward the Jewish population is 
as follows: we value too highly the standard 
of our cultural life, as well as order and tran-
quili ty, without which no state can exist, to 
approve arbitrary and brutal anti-Jewish acts, 
which are a blow to the honor and dignity of a 
great nation. One can, however, understand the 
instinct of cultural self-defense, and consider 
as natural the trend of the Polisn people 
toward economic independence. This is even 
.easier to understand in a time like ours, 
55 sachar, 181. 
of economic and financial unrest, when only a 
profound public consciousness, a readiness of 
sacrifice and an uncompromised binding of one's 
life and fortune with the state, can make it 
possible for theSt§~e to emerge from this 
unrest unimpaired. 5 
Economic boycotts were applied by large sections of the public 
• 
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aga:iJlst Jewish enterprises. It was hoped that by such means the Jew 
could be forced to emigrate. Several Polish Societies issued early in 
nineteen hundred thirty-eight the follow:iJlg proclamation: 
The simplest and most effective way of fighting 
the Jewish flood is the slogan: 'A Pole supports 
a Pole.' Depri v:ing the Jews of earning money 
means that they will be forced to leave Poland. 
This is the only radical solution of the Jewish 
question. Wi th the utmost forcefulness and 
with the deepest conviction of the necessity 
of self-defence, we urge all Christians not 
to sell to Jews any land or houses, nor to buy 
from Jewish stores, nor to employ Jewish lawyers, 
physicians, engineers, architects, artists, or 
any other professional men. 57 
In the meantime Government leaders explored every possible avenue to 
facilitate Jewish emigration from poland. 
56 Segal, 70. 
They approached the American diplomatic corps. 
They made representations to Britain not to 
lower the Jewish quota for palestine. They 
appealed to the League of Nations to convene 
an international conference to oonli~@~ migration 
outlets. When the rumour leaked out that Madagascar 
might become a possible heaven for refugees, 
Polish officials at once approached France to 
offer co-operation. The Jews had no warmer 
champions in international councils so long as the 
conversation turned to their migration from poland! 
57 Buell, Raymond Leslie, Poland: Key to Europe. N.Y. Alfred A. Knopf, 
1939, 299,300. 
Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, explained 
glibly that the anti-Semitism of his country 
was really the product of tremendous economic 
pressure. If this could only be relieved by 
Jewish evacuation, it would disappear. 58 
• 
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But there were no opportunities for large-scale emigration and the more 
realistic Polish leaders recognized the futility of relying upon any such 
mass evacuation. The economic persecution continued and the Jews lived 
in a state of perpetual unrest. 
Day and night they are 'controlled', their 
houses are'searched', and whatever in the 
opinion of the searchers constitutes a 
'superabundance of possessions' is taken without 
any furtiler ado. Although the Government has 
forbidden patrolling during the hours of the 
night, this sort of patrolling is continued 
without any official interference. Ever.y 
day the Jewish Committee of Succor hears of
5 new cases of murder and robbery and arson. 9 
Cries of: "Don't buy from the Jews 1 Have nothing to do with the Jews lit 
were heard on all sides while the reactionar.y press took up specific points 
towards making the boycott complete. 
Through its highly developed intelligence 
service it furnishes lists of Jewish enterprises 
in various 10 c ali ties: 'Thirty-six Jews are 
making a living here--they are depriving thirty-
six patriotic Poles of a livelihood! ••• Poles 
buying from Jews are photographed, identified, 
and their names published on the roll of dishonor 
in the local press. Peasants who 'sell their 
produce to Jews are beaten. The Polish artisan 
is urged to mark his goods with a special brand 
'so that no patriot may innocently buy Jewish-
made goods. T'ae Government, with 'national 
58 Sachar, 194,5. 
59 Article: ItJews in polandlt • Nation. CVIII: April 5, 1919, 531. 
interests' in mind sets up licensing and 
educational tests for artisans and merchants; 
and the examiners, of course, are Polish gom-
petitors in the same fields ot activity. 60 
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A program of elimination had its effect ll,pon the Jew, a process of 
steauy decline settled upon him, from large-scale trade to middle-scale 
trade, from middle-scale trade to petty trade) from petty trade to street 
peddling, whence the threshold of beggary was forced upon him. Such 
became the lot of the average Jew in Poland. 
Among the Jews, themselves, there was a division of opinion as to 
what was the best course to pursue. Some bel:ieved that their only hope 
lay in emphasis on the fact that they were Je'\'rs and in developing a true 
love for Jewish ideals. 
They wanted separate schools tor their children 
and also the right to manage t~eir own charities 
and other institutions. They believed that 
Judaism was a question not onl~ of religion, 
but also of race. They were anxious to preserve 
their racial culture, which co1tl.d only be done 
if the children were taught in Jewish schools. 61 
The Assimilators, on the other hand, were those Jews who believed 
that Judaism was only a question of religion. They wished to become 
entirely Polonized and felt that the establisQment of separate Jewish 
institutions would only deepen the already eXisting line of demarcation. 
They felt that a Jew whose family had lived in Poland for hundreds of years 
could be as good a Polish citizen as a man of Polish race. "We are tired 
of being treated as servants." They said. "A.t the present moment we 
&:J 
61 
Article: "J ews in poland: to Get Out Seellts the only Answer but Where 
Can They O<>?" A. G. Duker. Current HiStory: 45: Dec., 1936, 66. 
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are suffering from nationalist intolerance, but if We can only keep on 
fighting for justice we shall win through just as we did against religious 
t o II 62 persecu ~on •••• 
Before either party could prove the worth of its ideals, Nazism 
spread to Poland and it was Hitler who decided the fate of Jews and 
Poles, alike, in the years that were to follow and once more Poland was 
swallowed up by an avaricious neighbor. 
* * * 
In maqy respects the Polish Germans 
were better off than any other minority group 
in Poland. Although tue German representatives 
made repeated complaints to the League of Nations 
about the use of agrarian reforms as a means 
of depriving the German land-owners of their 
possessions, the fact remained that the German-
owned part of cul ti vated land had a much higher 
yield per hectare than the average Polish farms. 
Furthermore, taeir social and occupational 
structure was better balanced than that of the 
Poles or that of other na tional minorities. 63 
Politically, too, they had a more favourable position and the German 
Government at home did all she could to help her national abroad. Germany, 
alone, of the three former rulers of Poland had succeeded in establishing 
an important portion of nationals on Polish territory. The very power 
of the Germans in German Poland incurred Polish resentment against them 
and Polish nationalism became stronger there than elsewhere as a consequence. 
62 Ibid., 6l. 
63 Schmitt, 162,3. 
According to the Germans: 
The separation of the 'Corridor' and of Danzig 
from Prussia, and from the Reich, took place 
in 1919 against the will of large parts of the 
population, particularly in Danzig, and has 
produced an intolerable situation and a change 
in the map of Europe which appea~s absurd. 64 
The German language is spoten here and numerous economic, intellectual, 
and spiritual bonds link the people with the rest of Gennany. yet 
a large number of these Germans have, so to 
speak, no right to be there. Everyone knows 
with what infinite patience, vast expenditure 
of money and effort, and perfect indifference 
to justice or morali ty, the Prussian government 
has worked to fill its eastern provinces with 
Germans and to dispossess the poles of a land 
which has been theirs for a thousand years. 
The chef d'oeuvre of ~~e policy has been the 
work of the Imperial Colonization Commission 
which in the last thirty years has spent over 
500,000,000 marks in buying up property in the 
eastern provinces and settling German colonists 
upon it. Over 100,000 Germans have been brought 
in in this way. Half a dozen other official and 
semi-official organizations have been at work 
for the same purpose. In addition, the host 
of government functionaries, and servants 
in these provinces, the administrative, judicial, 
financial, railroad, telegraph, postal, forest, 
school officials and employees, have been recruited 
almost exclusively from the Germans, and very 
largely from Germans brought in from the west 
by the promise of higher pay· and other special 
privileges. 65 
64 International Conciliation, Documents for the Year 1933. "Danzig 
and the Polish Problem". Dr. J. A. Von Hamel. No. 28, March, 1933, 
145. 
65 Haskins and Lord, 174,5. 
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The minority in the "Corridor" according to the Polish inhabitants 
scarcely count as loyal subjects with whom cordial relations can be 
contemplated. A policy of reconciliation argues little hope of success 
against such antagonism. 
In order to alleviate some of these difficulties Germany and Poland 
signed the Geneva Convention in May, 1922. A mixed Commission and an 
Arbi tral Tribunal was established which settled many disputes connected 
with the minority schools, employment conditions, and general relations 
between the Poles and the Gemans. Bitterness, however, still reigned 
on botn sides of the German-Polish frontier. 
Nationalism is ramp an t. The Germans have 
made little attempt to understand the Poles, 
and innumerable Germans despise the Poles as 
members of a lower race. Even liberal opinion 
in Germany after the war predicted without 
regret the early disintegration of the resurrected 
state. Such an attitude changed gradually 
among many groups of Gemans Who realized the 
justification of the Polish Republic, though 
nationalistic circles continued to look down 
on the Poles. As a result, Germany's just 
claims in the eyes of the neutral world have 
been injured, while Poland's true strength 
has been misinterpreted. Imperialistic demands 
in 1919 and repressive measures against the 
German minority since then have necessari~5 
affected German sentiment toward Poland. 
The issue between Germany and poland is not only the problem of the 
Corridor, the strip of land which separates East Prussia from the Reich, 
but to this must be added the plight of Danzig and Upper Silesia, as well 
66 stone, 216. 
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as the irritations arising from the treatment of the Minorities in both 
poland and Germany. 
The entire dispute is only another phase of 
the tnousand year struggle between Teuton and 
Slav for the possession of the territor,y 
between the Oder and the Vistula, especially 
the land west of the Vistula--the present 
Polish province of Pomorze. The district has 
no great economic value in itself, but it provides 
Poland with an outlet to the sea and Germany 
with land that is essential. to her territorial 
unity. 67 
In August 1939 Hitler demanded the immediate return of the Free City, 
threatening war as an alternative. 
But Poland refused to permit Danzig to be 
returned, for she believed that Germany would 
use it as the spearnead of a drive to cut off 
the Corridor. In fact, Germany had already 
made her ultimate intentions clear by demanding 
the cession of a strip of territory across the 
Polish corridor to connect East Prussia to th'e 
main body 'of the Reich. If she were allowed 
to have Danzig, the Poles claimed she would soon 
also have this strip, and Poland would be a 
land-locked country like rtungary. For this 
reason the Poles prepared to fight the minute 
Germany attempted to occupy the Free City. To 
them the defense of their corridor to the 68 
sea was the defense of their independence. 
Realizing this danger, both France and Great Britain promised to come 
to Poland l s aid should Germany take steps which Poland believed woUld 
threaten her independence. Germany took such a step on the morning of 
September 1, 1939, and the result was the Second World War. 
67 Ibid., 272, 273. 
68 ny6Oski, Roman. Outlines of Polish Histor,y. London, George Allen 
and Unwin, Ltd., 1925, 86.--
CHAPTER IV 
ACTION OF THE LEAGUE 
The international protection of minorities found in the Versailles 
system at the close of the First World War was not a new creation. For 
more than two hundred years, from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the 
Treaty of Berlin in 1878, special minorities provisions had been known. 
Three innovations, however, characterized this new system, "first, the 
unprecedented geographical scope of the protection; second, the objects 
of the protection; and, third, the permanent and collective character 
of the enforcement of the minorities treaties." 69 These treaties them-
selves stated that the obligations which they laid down were to be secured 
by the guarantee of the League of Nations. In January, 1920 the League 
formally came into being. In the twenty years that the League existed, 
Poland became the best client in the sphere of minority questions. 
Though the Council of the League and its administrative organ, the 
Minorities Section of the Secretariat, d~voted more of their time and 
efforts to Polish minority questions, than to those of any other country, 
It is a somewhat bitter reflection that in 
Poland could be seen one of the most typical 
examples of the failure of the League to 
prevent the German Government from constantly 
poisoning the atmosphere in which questions 
concerning a German minority were discussed, 
and to persuade the government of the country 
69 Robinson, ),4. 
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containing that minority that the most effective 
way of counteracting German activities was to 
fulfill its obligations generously and to work 
continuously for the cultural and economic 
benefit of the minority population. 70 . 
45 
About one million Germans left Poland following the establishment of 
the new Republic and complaints were made to the League of Nations in the 
form of German minority petitions, that official measures of the Polish 
r~vernment were responsible for the departure of more than 400,000 of them. 
Some of the best known records of the World Court have dealt with different 
aspects bearing on this problem. Questions relating to settlers of the 
German ~ace and that of the acquisition of Polish nationality occupied 
the attention of the League of Nations for years. They were first brought 
before the League by a petition dated November 8th, 1921. 
The 'Deutschtumsbund' (a German association 
to safeguard the rights of German minorities 
in Poland) sent the Secretary General of the 
League of Nations a telegram informing him 
that several thousand families of farmers of 
German origin had been called upon by the 
Polish Government to leave their farms before 
December 1st., 1921. 
In accordance with the procedure prescribed 
for urgent cases, the telegram was communicated 
both to the Members of the Council of the 
League and also to the Polish representative, 
and the latter announced that the period of 
grace had been extended beyond December 1st., 
and that the Polish Government, for humanitarian 
reasons, and decided that, whatever terms 
of expulsion might be fixed by the competent 
tribunals, these expulSions would only be 
carried out progressively and in no case before 
May 1st., 1922. 
70 AZcarte, 29. 
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On several occasions subsequently the 
Polish Government, at the request of the 
Council, agreed to postpone administrative or 
judicial measures which might have prejudicially 
affected the normal position of the settlers 
referred to in the petition. 71 
• 
Persons of the German race, in virtue of a Prussian law of 1886, 
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and of subsequent legislation had settled in territories which in 1919, 
under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, became part of the Polish Republic. 
Some of the settlers had concluded contracts (Rentengutsvertrag) with 
the Prussian Government entitling them to the property in perpetuity in 
return for a fixed annual payment, while others were granted a 
"Pachtvertrag rt , or lease, granted for a certain number of years. 
In the Treaty of Versailles there is 
an article which lays down that the Powers to 
which German territory is ceded shall acquire 
all property and possessions situated therein 
belonging to the German Empire, and that the 
value of such acquisitions shall be credited 
to the German Government. Under the terms of 
this article such property is deemed to include 
interalia all the property of the German Crown, 
Empire and States. A Polish law was passed on 
July 14th., 1920, whereby the name of the 
Polish State was automatically substituted in 
the land registers for those of the legal 
persons referred to above, among others, if 
the entry in the register was made later than 
November 11th., 1918. Any mortgage or real 
right registered on behalf of any of these 
persons since that date was regarded as cancelled 
in favor of the Polish State. 
71 The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities of ~, 
Language and Religion. The League of Nations Secretariat Geneva. 
Information Section-Revised Edition, 1927, 62-63. 
The Polish Government considered itself 
entitled by these provisions simply to expel 
settlers who had not become Polish nationals, 
if it regarded their titles as invalid from 
its own point of view, that is to say those 
whose Rentengusvertrag (contract) although 
cond1uded before November 11th., 1918, had not 
been followed by an Auflassung (conveyance), 
a formality which was essential to complete 
the title to property, and also those settlers 
whose Pachivertrag (lease) though concluded 
before that date, had not been converted into 
a Rentengutsvertrag after that date. 72 
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After much consideration of the question the Council of the League 
of Nations finally decided, in accordance with the view of a Committee 
composed of the representatives of Brazil, the British Empire and Italy 
t.hat the 
72 Ibid. 
question of the settlers of German race in 
Poland should be regulated on the basis of 
the advisory opinion given by the Court, with 
which the Council concurred; but as it appeared 
impossible for practical reasons to reestablish 
in their properties the settlers who had 
already been expelled, the Council considered 
that these settlers 'should receive from the 
Polish Government fair compensation for the 
losses which they had suffered as a result 
of the fact that they had not been left in 
undisturbed possession of their lands. It 
hoped that the Polish Government would be 
willing to formulate proposals on these 
bases. Negotiations were carried on between 
the Polish Government and the Council Committee 
during March, April, and May 1924. 
Lastly, on June 17th., the Council 
took note of an agreement between the Polish 
Government and the Committee of the Council, 
by which the Polish Government would pay a 
1~ sum as compensation to the German 
settlers. The agreement provided that compen-
sation amounting in all to 2,700,000 zlotys 
(gold francs) should be divided among 500 
settlers who could show that they were of 
Polish nationality. It was to be increased 
if the number of settlers were more than 20 
above the figure fixed (500), and reduced 
if their number did not exceed 400. Further 
the Apportionment of the sum set aside for 
cO:t!1Pensation was to be carried out by an agent 
in the confidence of the Polish Government 73 
and in agreement with the settlers concerned. 
Among the articles of the Minorities Treaties several dealt with 
the problem of nationality, a problem that was to offer the League a 
pertinent field of activity. 
But 
73 Ibid. 
Article 3 has reference to former German, 
Austrian, Hungarian and Russian nationals, 
habitually resident at the date of the coming 
into force of the treaty in territory which is 
or may be recognized as forming part of Poland, 
and admits such persons to be Polish nationals 
ipso facto •••• The Article then gives power 
to the persons above referred to who were over 
eighteen years of age to opt out of Polish 
nationality. 74 
The question with which the Council had to 
deal in connection with the petition of the 
Deutschumsbund included the interpretation 
of Article 4 of the Polish Minorities Treaty. 
This article lays down that: 
'Poland admits and declares to be Polish 
nationals ipso facto and without the require-
ment of any formality persons of German, 
Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality 
who were born in the said territory of parents 
habitually resident there, even if at the date 
of the coming into force of the present Treaty 
48 
74 Pr'Oblems 
tondon: 
Transactions of the Grotius Society, V. 18, 
they are not themselves habitually resident 
there. ' 
The Polish Government considered itself 
entitled under this article to refuse to 
recognize as Polish nationals persons Who 
were formerly German subjects if their parents 
were not habitually resident in territory 
which is now part. of Poland both on the date 
Qf birth of the person concerned and on the . 
date of the entry into force of the Minorities 
treaty, namely January 10th, 1920. It regarded 
them as still possessing German nationality 
and consequently applied to them the treatment 
laid down for persons of non-Polish nationality, 
and refused them the right to benefitr-by the 
guarantees accorded by that Treaty. 7~ 
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The question was reffered to the League but the Polish Government 
being of the opinion that Article 4 of the Minorities Treaty was not 
one of those which was placed under the guarantee of the League of 
Nations, would not give its approval to any interpretation of the 
article rendered by the League. Negotiations between the German and 
Polish Governments were then initiated but, as there seemed to be no 
hope of settling the question under this arrangement, an appeal was 
made to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court gave 
its opinion on September 15th., 1923. 
75 
It concluded that the League of Nations was 
competent and that under the terms of Article 
4 it would be sufficient if the parents were 
habitually resident in the ceded territory 
at the date of birth of the persons concerned. 
On September 25th., 1923, the Council 
adopted the Court's opinion and invited its 
rapporteur to offer his good offices to the 
Polish government in conSidering how to 
apply the provisions of the Treaty, and for 
e of Nations and ~ Protection of Minorities ~ Race, 
negotiation if necessary with the German 
Government (1) at Geneva in regard to Articles 
3 and 4 of the Minorities Treaty, and (2), 
at any other place in regard to questions 
connected therewith. In the 14th. of the 
same month the Council approved the Polish 
Government's programme. 
The Geneva negotiations opened on 
February 12th., 1924, under the presidency 
of the Brazilian representative on the Council. 
As the other negotiations had led to no result, 
the Council, on March 14th., 1924 passed a 
resolution requesting the German and Polish 
Governments to continue their negotiations 
on all the questions at issue under the 
presidency of a third person who should act 
as mediator. If no settlement were reached 
by July 1st., 1924, this third person should 
have full power to arbitrate. The Council 
added that the President of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal of Upper Silesia might undertake 
this duty. 
The Council's resolution was approved 
by both parties, and negotiations were accord-
ingly opened on April 28th, 1924 at Vienna. 
Th~ continued beyond the period prescribed 
so that, although the period was extended 
by some weeks, the arbitral procedure came 
into operation; and they finally terminated 
on August 30th., with the Signing of a 
Protocol whereby both parties were satisfied 
on the agreement reached which was ratified at 
Warsaw on February 10th., 1925. At its thirty-
fourth session the Council took note (June 
8th., 1925) of the exchange of ratifications 
and approved the clauses of the Concention 
in so far as they concerned the League of 
Nations in virtue of the Minorities Treaty. 76 
Another opportunity to test its ability came to the League from 
50 
Upper Silesia where conflict between the Poles and the Germans was rife 
in the years that followed the war. The Treaty of Versailles had assigned 
76 Ibid. 
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to Poland only a small part of Prussian Silesia, and had provided for 
a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. All the residents of the province over 
twenty years of age were given the right to choose between the rule of 
Poland or Germany. The final decision on the frontiers was to be based 
largely upon the vote of the people. The plebescite was fixed for the 
twentieth of March, 1921, but gave no clear result. 
In a large part of Silesia, Poland gained 
a great majority of the Communes, but larger 
towns, German islands in the midst of Polish 
territory, which had only come into being in 
the nineteenth century, voted German. In 
all 678 communes voted for Poland as against 
844 for Germany, While of the individual votes 
Germany obtained 701,000, Poland 419,000. 
In the eastern districts, which are economically 
the most important, being rich in coal and 
factories, the Poles secured a numerical 
preponderance, thougQ this was not every-
where sufficiently great; on the other hand 
the western districts, Which are agricultural 
and ethnographiCal17 Polish voted in great part for Germany. 7 
Germany immediately began to claim the whole of Silesia, while Poland 
under the leadership of Korfanty demanded the regions where the Poles had 
had the majority of votes. 
The 'Korfanty line' included the Whole of 
the industrial portion and a small part of 
the agricultural one, viz, the land as far 
as the Oder River above Kosel, then along a 
line running northeast, west of Strzelec and 
east of 01esna. In that district 420,000 
individual constituents and 560 communes· had 
voted for Poland as against 400~OOO constituents 
and 150 communes for Germany. 7 
11 Reddaway, 516. 
18 Ibid. 
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The dispute between the two nations developed into open conflict and 
it was only through pressure from the outside that a cessation of hos-
tilities was effected. It was finally agreed to submit the question to 
the Council of the League of Nations, whose findings were to be unreser-
vedly accepted. 
The League Council, having had the matter 
examined by a Commission of representatives 
of disinterested states, gave its verdict on 
12 October, 1921. The frontier between Poland 
and Germany was so fixed that Poland received 
the whole districts of Psyczyna, Katowice 
(urban and rural), Krolewska, Hut a , almost 
the whole of the district of Rybnik, the part 
of the district of Raciborz (Ratibor) which 
lies on the right bank of the Oder, the greatest 
part of the districts of Tarnowskie Gory and 
Lubliniec, and fragments of the districts 
of Zabrze, Benthen and Gkuivitz, without, 
however, those three towns. This area 
comprised about )000 sq. km. with almost 
1,000,000 inhabitants. Thus, besides the 
agricultural districts of Psyczyna and Rybnik, 
Poland was to have a considerable part of the 
industrial area. Poland was assigned 76 per 
cent of the coal mines (59 mines out of 67), 
97 per cent of the iron ore, 82 per cent of the 
tin, 71 per cent of the lead, 50 per cent 
of the sulphur, 50 per cent of the coke, all 
the tin-works and lead-works (a total of I), 
all the flax-spinning mills·, 5 tin-rolling 
mills out of 9, about 50 per cent of the iron-
works, the power-station and the factory 
of nitrogen products of Chorzow. 79 
The League Council not only traced the line which was to divide 
Upper Silesia but, taking into consideration the economic bonds, the 
water-supply and electric systems, the mutual exchange of raw materials 
79 ~., 517. 
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and semi-manufactured products by the different concerns, and the 
location of the workmen's settlements, which closely linked the industrial 
district together, the Council, also, proposed that for a period of 
fifteen years special regulations concerning the economic connection of 
the two parts with each other and with Germany should be maintained. 
The decision thus rendered by the Council though painful to both Poland 
and Germany was, nevertheless, accepted by them. To ensure the observance 
of the obligations of each nation, a Mixed Commission was set up at 
Katowice, and a Tribunal of Arbitration at Benthen, under presidents 
appointed by. the League of Nations. Legally, the German minority of 
Upper Si1esia was, until July 15th., 1937, better protected than the other 
national minorities in Poland. The final decision of the Council 
contains the following stipulations: 
A Minorities Office is to be set up in both 
portions of the Plebiscite territory. 
Persons belonging to a minority may, after 
having filed a complaint with the highest 
Administrative authority, submit a petition 
to the Minorities Office of their State for 
consideration. If the Minorities Office 
does not succeed in obtaining satisfaction 
for the petitioners, it shall transmit the 
petition, together with any comments it may 
wish to make to the chairman of the Mixed 
Commission for his opinion. The Chairman will 
afford the members of the Mixed Commission 
opportunity to express their views. (The 
Mixed Commission is composed of two Germans 
and two Poles, and a Chairman of some other 
nationa1ity--Artic1e 562 of the Convention). 
The Chairman will then make known his opinion 
to the Minorities Office, which will communicate 
it to the proper administrative authorities. 
In case the petitioners are not satisfied 
with the findings of the administrative 
authori ty, they may appeal to the Council 
of the League of Nations. Such appeals must 
be addressed to the Minorities Office, which 
will see that they are forwarded to the 
Council by the Government. The Council of 
the League of Nations is also competent to 
give a decision concerning any individual or 
collective petition addressed to it directly 
by persons belonging to a minority. 80 
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However trivial or improbable the offenses, the League was bound 
to take official notice of them and request explanations from the Polish 
Government. As a consequence many problems concerning the German 
minority in Poland came before this former international body. 
The minority problem is not Wholly 
economic or cultural but embraces many other 
of the complexities of group life. Conse-
quently the disputes which have arisen between 
the German minority and the Polish government 
have been as diverse as they have been frequent. 
The conflicts in Posen and Pomorze in the first 
years after the ratification of the peace . 
treaty were mostly concerned with liquidating 
German property, but most of the German com-
plaints from Polish Upper Silesia center on 
the entrance requirements for German minority 
schools.. The Poles, seeking to consolidate 
a national Polish State, naturally wish to 
limit the number of children attending the 
minority schools. During the years following 
the partition the German vote in Polish Upper 
Silesia increased each election and there was 
a corresponding increase in the number of 
children registered in the German schools. 
But after the Polish election campaign in 
November, 1930, in Which physical violence 
accompanied intimidation, the German minority 
in Polish Upper Silesia was weakened. Protests 
80 The League of Nations and Minorities, Information Section. League 
or-Nations Secretariat;--Geneva, 1923, 21. 
to the League followed and after long and 
serious negotiations the Council of the 
League in Sept., 1931, settled ~he difficulties 
arising from these occurences. 1 
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When Germany joined the League and became a member of the Council 
in 1926 she obtained the right to intervene on behalf of her minority 
in Poland. This right was constantly exercised by Germany in the years 
that followed. The Poles are probably correct in saying: 
that no other government abused this privilege 
as much as the government of the German 
Republic. In order to foster revisionist 
propaganda and to keep the "Corridor" 
question before world opinion, the Weimar 
regime brought innumerable complaints before 
the League Council and the World Court. 
In Poland's eyes, the German minority came 
to occupy quite a different position from 
that of other nationalities; the Germans 
were looked upon as enemies of the state, 
a docile instrument of German propaganda. 82 
With Hitler, the situation changed. Through money and violence he 
tried to nazify the German minorities in other countries, but he did not 
support their rights as citizens. 
In the case of Poland, he gave far less 
protection and help to the Germans than did 
the Weimar regime. Furthermore, the policy 
of the Nazis toward their own minorities 
deprives them of the moral right of protesting 
against the oppression of Germans in foreign 
lands. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, 
in spite of the millions spent by the Hitler 
regime to promote Nazism among Germans abroad 
and to intensify German nationalism, the 
81 Article: "Polish-German Dispute fl - S. Stone. Current History. 38: 
June, 1933, 274. 
, 82 Buell, 243. 
result of Nazi policy is the weakening of the 
position of the German minority in Poland. 83 
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Though the right of appeal to the League of Nations was employed 
by the German minority particularly, the Jews, on the other hand, 
submitted but a negligible number of petitions to Geneva. Out of but 
three occasions when complaints of a collective nature were forwarded 
to the League in the interest of a Jewish minority, only one was of 
Polish origin. The Berheim Petition in 1933, was a ~rotest against the 
application of Nazi racial legislation in Upper Si1esia. The case was 
won by the complainants. 
The Jews, unlike other minorities had never formed part of a 
majority in any European state; consequently they received no instructions 
from powerful outside sources. They were acutely conscious of the need 
for good relations with the State within which they lived and, though 
they fought consistently against any discrimination within their own 
state, they were reluctant to address any appeal to an international 
body, believing that winning a case against their own Government would 
result in only a Pyrrhic victory at best. 
However the Jewish problem of Poland was brought to the attention 
of the League by the Polish r~vernment, itself, in 1936, when Colonel 
Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister, called the attention of the Council 
to the Polish population problem and to the interest of his country 
in the Mandate system. On October 5th, 1936 Mr. Rose, representing 
83 Segal, 171, 172. 
foland at a meeting of the economic committee of the Assembly of the 
League of Nations, stated: 
that emigration was a very important problem 
in many countries and had many aspects the 
seriousness of which should not be under-
estimated. In Poland, for instance, the 
emigration of Jews to Palestine was one of 
the factors which led to the introduction 
of foreign exchange control. At the same 
Assembly, in 1936, Mr. Komarnicki, the 
permanent delegate of Poland to the League 
of Nations, discussed the interest of Poland 
in the development of Palestine. Poland, 
he added, possessed a large Jewish population 
which must emigrate. It was, therefore, 
desirable to find other outlets for the over-
populated area~ of Central Europe, outside 
of Palestine. 4 
Thus, Poland, a State ordinarily jealous of herown sovereignty, 
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and resentful of any interference in her internal affairs, thought it 
advisable to turn to the League of Nations for support. 
The Jewish minority in Poland, also, was to suffer added injuries 
from the neighboring State of Germany, for when Hitler took power there 
at the beginning of 1933, 
84 Ibid., 86. 
the Nazis extended their anti-Jewish drive 
to the whole world. They financed both the 
German minority in Poland and Polish anti-
Semitic propaganda, hoping thus not only to 
hurt Jews but to win the sympathy even of the 
Polish nationalists, who heretofore had been 
the enemies of Germany. Thus, the younger 
National Democrats opposed the traditional 
anti-German policy of the party, pushed the 
Hitlerist "solution" of the Jewish question, 
and finally, in 1934, seceded from the party and 
created the National Radical party, "Nara a. 
The older National Democratic party was 
forced to follow. It also became more and 
more "radical" in its anti-Jewish program. 85 
Suddenly, all the deep-seated grievances against the Jews were 
brushed aside and swallowed up by a new danger that threatened Poland 
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and in the incredible devastations of a new World War, the Jews rallied 
along with other groups to the defence of the Fatherland. 86 
Though public opinion interested in minority questions has by no 
means had an unreserved admiration for the Geneva system and has even, 
at times, adopted an openly critical attitude toward it, still the 
system during its twenty-year life span achieved along with the redress 
of individual grievances many notable results. The two decades which 
marked the birth and development of the League were periods of political 
and social conflicts of almost unprecedented magnitude. International 
equilibrium and internal balance weighed on unstable conditions. The 
political immaturity of new States and the virtual chaos from which 
many countries emerged after the first World War promised but little 
substantial security for the League1s endeavors. We can only judge 
fairly of its operations viewing it in the light of this unfavorable 
setting. 
86 Ibid., 203, 204. 
CONCLUSION 
No single problem in Europe is so acute as that of minorities. 
Within every state there can be found diversity of blood, language, 
and culture. "Differences of culture often reach back across the 
centuries and are perpetuated through song and saga, folk dances, feast 
days and fast days, and in the woof and web of folk ways and mores. It 87 
Only in nations in which minority groups, themselves, have sought to 
amalgamate with the dominant group lIls assimilation been possible and 
then, only over a period of several generations. 
It cannot be enforced from the top. History 
is replete with illustrations of the failure 
of mandatory conformity. Armenians retained 
their culture through nearly a thousand years 
of persecution. Bohemia remained Czech through 
the 500 years of shifting governmental allegience, 
and Poland retained its cultural autonomy 
though divided, like Gaul, into three parts 
for more than a century. The peasant cottage 
much more than the homes of the upper classes 
is the stronghold of minority cultures, 
frequently buttressed by the church and the 
market plaee. The theory of assimilation will 
not, at least in our generation, be translated 
into reality. 88 
All human beings, whether members of national majorities or minorities 
are primarily interested in the respect of fundamental human rights: 
life, liberty--freedom of expression and worship--and the pursuit of 
happiness. Nationality is based on community of culture; thus it is but 
natural that each national majority should seek the retBnsion of its 
87 Brown, 44. 
88 ~., 46-47. 59 
minorities. But that it has done so, at times, at the expense of the 
fundamental human rights deprives it of justification. It was in the 
hope of offering some measure of security against such action that the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers created and gave their support 
to the League of Nations, hoping, thereby, to guarantee and effective 
plan of protection for the Minorities. The treaties which incorporated 
this protective measure were part of a system which 
was intended to ensure that, in the future, 
action taken in defense of the rights of 
minorities should, both in fact and in public 
opinion, be taken without reference to the 
special interests of any individual Power. 
At the same time, they secured the not less 
essential result that the loyalty of the 
minorities to the state of which they form a 
part should not be exposed to the special 
temptations arising from a faculty of direct 
intervention given to a neighbouring state with 
which they might have special affinities of 
race or of sentiment. The purpose of the 
treaties was to ensure that the minorities 
should, for the future, enjoy conditions which 
would enable them, without loss of their 
religious or cultural heritage, to bring the 
State of which they now form a part, that 
loyal cooperation on Which was stressed the 
importance that nothing should be done to 
impair these principles. 
In the second place, both the authors 
of the Treaties, and the Council in developing 
its procedure, have been at pains to avoid 
creating a situation which would place the 
Government of any State having undertaken 
obligations, and any minority or member of a 
minority within that State, in a position 
analogous to that of parties opposed to 
one another in legal or arbitral proceedings. 
The authors of the treaties deliberately 
rejected any proposal Which could give countenence 
to the conception of any minority forming a 
separate corporation within the State. 
If the Council decided that petitions relating 
to the treatment of minorities, whether received 
from members of a minority or not, should~ 
under certain conditions, be communicated. to 
its members, it made it clear that it regarded 
these petitions solely as sources of informa-
tion, and that the only parties to any action 
which might arise there from would be the 
Governments of individual members of the 
Councilor the Council itself. Here, again, 
we have a principle which is not only clearly 
a part of the system as laid down in the 
treaties, but whose maintenance is essential 
to their satisfactory working on behalf of 
the Governments and the minorities concerned. 89 
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The origin and pur:nose of the Minorities Treaties is clearly expressed 
in a letter addressed by Clemenceau on June 24th, 1919, to Paderewski 
when in its final form the text of the Polish Treaty was communicated to 
him. 
In formally communicating to you the 
final decision of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers in this matter, I should 
desire to take this opDortunity of exolaining 
in a more formal manner than has hitherto 
been done the considerations by which the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers have 
been guided in dealing with the question. 
1. In the first place, I would point 
out that this Treaty does not constitute 
any fresh departure. It has for long been 
the established procedure of the public law 
of Europe that when a State is created, or 
even when large accessions of territory are 
made to an established state, the jOint and 
formal recognition by the Great Powers should be 
accompanied by the requirement that such a 
State should, in the form of a binding inter-
national convention undertake to comply with 
certain principles of government. This principle, 
89 League of Nations Official Journal-Special Supplement No. 73 Documents 
~elating-to the Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations b b ·sfi n £ dance with the Council Resolution of June 13th, 1921) 
for which there are numerous other precedents, 
received the most explicit sanction when, at 
the last great assembly of European Powers--" 
the Congress of Berlin--the sovereignty and 
independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Roumania were recognized • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. The Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers are of opinion that they would be false 
to the responsibility which rests upon them 
if on this occasion they departed from what 
has become an established tradition. In this 
connection, I must also recall to your con-
sideration the fact that it is to the endeavours 
and sacrifices of the Powers in whose name I 
am addressing you that the Polish nation owes 
the recovery of its independence. It is by 
their decision that Polish sovereignty is being 
re-established over the territories in question 
and that the inhabitants of these territories 
are being incorporatep in the Polish Nation. 
It is on the supnort which the resources of 
these Powers will afford to the League of Nations 
that, for the future, Poland will to a large 
extent depend for the secure possession of 
these territories. There rests, therefore, 
upon these Powers an obligation, which they 
cannot evade, to secure in the most permanent 
and solemn form guarantees for certain essential 
rights which will afford to the inhabitants 
the necessary protection whatever changes may 
take place in the internal constitution of the 
Polish State. 90 
It is true that the new treaty differed in form from earlier 
Conventions dealing with similar matters but this was a "necessary 
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consequence and an essential part of the new system of international 
relations" 91 which the establishment of the League of Nations built up. 
90 The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities of Race, 
Language ana-Religion,-p7 44=4$. 
91 ~., 4S:--
, 
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Experience proved that the older system, where the guarantee for the 
execution of similar provisions was invested in the Great Powers, was 
ineffective. If the Peace of the world was to be established and main-
tained protective provisions for the numerous minorities of Europe had 
to be seriously considered in the drafting of the treaties that aimed 
at so universal a concept. That such treaties were imposed and signed 
was in itself a great contribution to the restoration of that peace in 
Europe. 
Without the deterrent influence introduced 
by the League and without the prospect of 
possible redress at Geneva, it is not difficult 
to iMagine what Europe would have been like 
at the end of the First World War, with all 
its passions rampant, with new frontiers, and 
a new but uns~ttled balance of domination and 
submission. 9 
There were positive achievements which marked the experiment, too. 
Certain minorities were rescued from ignorance and the level of their 
social and cultural state was raised as a consequence; renresentatives 
of minority groups began to participate in governmental affairs; and, 
in some cases, we find the development of an extensive minorities' 
school system. 
Confronted with diametrically opposed points of view, and evidences 
of both failure and success, it is extremely difficult to arrive at an 
objective appraisal of the system of international protection of minorities 
as adopted in the peace treaties we have been considering. It is not the 
92 Robinson. Minorities ~ ~ League of Nations. 14. 
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purpose of this paper either to condemn or approve the experiment. One 
obvious conclusion might be arrived at in the course of this study, how-
ever, and that is that there seems to be no panacea for the minority 
problem. Contradictions face one on every hand. 
There are conflicting statistics and there 
are claims and counterclaims. Consequently it 
is not always possible to find out the truth, 
and one cannot be arbitrary in apportioning 
praise and blame. In many cases, no doubt, 
both sides sincerely believed in their conten-
tions. So we cannot be dogmatic when we are 
discussing such an inextricable tangle of age-
old conflicts as these. For no human being can 
know even a majority of the answers to these 
problems which spring up everywhere to create 
economic disorder and the threat of war. 
But we can set down some conclusions that 
will hardly be disputed. 
In the first place, we have learned that 
in one oart of Europe after another it is 
impossible to draw a satisfactory frontier 
through mixed nationality areas. For the 
existence of minority "islands" makes it 
impossible. 
Second, we have seen examples of the 
exchange of minorities, and we know that it 
would be impracticable to attempt to repeat 
these migrations on a scale large enough to 
relieTe a Europe's minority problems. So 
nearly all the minority peoples must stay where 
they are, in the lands they and their fore-
fathers have inhabited for centuries. 
The third point follows from these. It 
is that there is no way by which everybody can 
at tain 'self -determination' • For self -determina-
tion for one people may mean the invasion of 
another people's rights, and if we tried to 
give every people in Europe the free rein of 
geographical self-determination the result would 
be something very much like anarchy. 
But, fourth, the persecution or repression 
of minorities is no solution either. Perhaps 
the best that can be said of it is that sooner 
or later it is almost certain to react against 
the majority applying it. 93 
• 
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Poland, by no means, stood alone in Europe with the task of solving 
a grave minDrity situation but it certainly presented one of the major 
difficulties of this rebuilt state, and occupied more than just a fair 
share of the attention of the new world forum, the League of Nations. 
The serious problems arising from her mixed national composition and with 
which Poland grappled in this post-war era were not new to her historical 
experience either, but unawakened national aspirations in the past had 
made the task a less difficult one with Which to cop,. The new state 
of Poland rising up between the two great millstones of Russia and 
Germany felt that her greatest safeguard lay in a strong national unity. 
No obstacle must hinder its achievement. Her treatment of her minority 
peoples was, therefore, not always benevolent or wise, while 
the restless fluctuation of shifting parliamentary 
coalitions which produced Poland's numerous early 
Cabinets, as well as the unstable tenure of local 
administrative office under these conditions of 
parliamentary government were not at all favourable 
to the maintenanc~4of any consistent line of 
minority policy. ' 
Any comprehensive and constructive program providing for future contin-
gencies with regard to the minority problems of Poland was interrupted 
When the disintegration of the State once more set in under the destructive 
power of Hitler's invading ar~. 
93 Dyboski-Out1ines of Polish History, 92-94. 
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